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"Whenever a campaign or other big organization knows much more about you and your 
habits than you know about them, any voter is open to manipulation." - Chris Calabrese, 
privacy lobbyist for the American Civil Liberties Union (in an interview with Beckett, 2012)  
Introduction 
Many modern political campaigns use psychological profiling in order to influence voting decisions. I 
argue that this practice threatens the autonomy of voters. In doing so, I develop a theoretical  
account of autonomy. In order to protect voters from psychological profiling, I suggest a form of 
“privacy paternalism,” which prevents people from acquiescing to the trade and aggregation of their 
personal data. 
My thesis involves two separate claims. The first is that psychological profiling is capable of violating 
autonomy. The second is that, because psychological profiling can violate autonomy, it should be 
outlawed. The structure of my paper is as follows. The opening three sections deal with the first 
claim of my thesis. In section one, I present an imaginary case study in which Amy, an undecided 
voter, is influenced by a psychological profiling team. In section two, I argue that an intuitive account 
of autonomy fails to accurately determine whether or not Amy’s voting decision is autonomous, 
because it cannot distinguish between persuasive and manipulative influences. In section three, I 
argue that John Christman’s hierarchical account of autonomy is capable of making such a 
distinction. Using Christman’s account, it becomes clear why psychological profiling violates Amy’s 
autonomy. 
The remaining sections deal with my second claim; that psychological profiling should be outlawed. 
In section four, I propose that this can be done via a form of “privacy paternalism,” which conflicts 
with Christman’s account of autonomy. In section five, I expose the flaws in Christman’s account. In 
section six, I argue that Christman’s account should be modified. In section seven, I argue that, under 
my alternative account of autonomy, “privacy paternalism” is justified.  
1. The story of the floating voter 
Amy is an undecided, “floating” voter, taking a keen interest in this year’s presidential election. One 
of the candidates is a populist politician who voices strongly xenophobic opinions. At first, Amy found 
his views morally abhorrent, because she sincerely identifies as a global egalitarian; she believes that 
all human beings should be treated as moral equals. However, most of Amy’s friends feel the 
opposite, and they frequently share articles and posts on social media which are supportive of the 
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politician. Over time, Amy has begun to normalize and internalize these xenophobic opinions, 
occasionally mimicking them in her own online posts. 
Amy watches the presidential debates on cable television, reads online news articles, and voices her 
opinions about the candidates on social media. Information about all of these activities is collected 
and stored in databases, a process to which Amy agreed when signing up to each service. She also 
acquiesced to the potential future sale of that data to third parties.  
Part of the populist politician’s campaign involves the use of a psychological profiling team. Because 
Amy exchanged her personal data in return for access to digital services, the team is able to influence 
her actions. They purchase data about Amy from the digital services that she uses, and from other 
sources including government censuses, voter registration databases, call logs from mobile phone 
companies and consumer purchase records. This data is then aggregated into a complex 
psychological profile, capable of revealing Amy’s innermost beliefs and desires. An algorithm 
identifies Amy as a “persuadable voter” who cares primarily about security, but also, increasingly, 
about immigration. A psychologist, working for the profiling team, accurately ascertains that Amy 
has a “neurotic” personality. 
On election day, Amy remains undecided. She has strong reservations regarding the morality of 
voting for the populist. Then she receives a telephone call from someone on that politician’s 
campaign team. He reads from a script which has been specially tailored to influence Amy. Given 
Amy’s “neuroticism”, the campaigner’s computer prompts him to use emotive, fearful language in 
their conversation. He strongly emphasies the fact that some immigrants are planning to perform 
terrorist attacks within the country. This stimulates Amy’s fears about security. 
Later that day, Amy decides to vote for the populist candidate. She walks to the polling station and 
puts a cross in the appropriate box on her ballot paper. 
Two years later, Amy has moved to a different area and left her old circle of friends behind. When 
debating moral principles with her family, she continues to promote her beliefs in global 
egalitarianism. Her teenage son recalls that she voted for the populist politician, and points out the 
contradiction between his policies and Amy’s deeply held beliefs. That night, Amy reflects on her 
voting decision and is full of regret – she doesn't feel as if that action authentically represented her 
values. 
While this particular case study is a work of imagination, modern political campaign teams employ 
psychological profiling in these exact ways in order to influence voting decisions. The technique was 
pioneered in the United States by Barack Obama in his 2008 and 2012 electoral campaigns, which 
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“used precision targeting to build rich data-driven profiles of every potential voter in the United 
States, using this data to precisely tune its messaging at the person level” (Leetaru, 2016). Obama’s 
team identified “persuadable voters” and then “directed volunteers to scripted conversations … with 
the objective of changing minds” (Issenberg, 2012). In 2016 the British “Vote Leave” campaign 
(Payne, 2016), the Republican nominee Ted Cruz (Hamburger, 2015) and the president-elect Donald 
Trump (Kranish, 2016) employed the services of Cambridge Analytica. This company “incorporates 
private profile data from tens of millions of Facebook users” with more than “50,000 data points 
gathered from voting records, popular websites and consumer information such as magazine 
subscriptions, car ownership and preferences for food and clothing” (Leetaru, 2016). The chief 
executive of the company claimed that his behavioral psychologists were able to use this data to 
“determine the personality of every single adult in the United States of America,” and could thereby 
“identify millions of voters who are most open to being persuaded to support Trump” (Kranish, 
2016).  
Although most of the publically available information about this form of psychological profiling 
comes from the United Kingdom and the United States, it would be a mistake to assume that it is an 
isolated phenomenon. Cambridge Analytica claims to have “worked on campaigns in 22 countries” 
(Ibid.). This fact, coupled with the global influence wielded by the United Kingdom, the United States, 
and their corporations, entails that the use of psychological profiling to influence voting decisions 
should be of worldwide concern.1 
2. An intuitive account of autonomy 
I claim that the use of psychological profiling to influence voting decisions should be outlawed, 
because it puts the autonomous status of these voting decisions under threat. The strength of my 
thesis thus depends on a convincing descriptive account of personal autonomy. In this section, I 
present some common sense, intuitive assumptions surrounding the concept of autonomy. Then, I 
show that an intuitive account of autonomy fails to accurately determine whether or not Amy’s 
voting decision was autonomous, because it does not give us a clear answer as to whether the 
influence of the profiling team upon Amy’s desires was persuasive or manipulative. This entails that 
a theoretical account of autonomy is required. 
                                                          
1 This paper focuses exclusively on the relatively new use of psychological profiling to influence voting 
decisions. However, it must be noted that the practice has been an established part of the advertising industry 
for the past twenty years, as an effective method for influencing consumer decisions (Gunter, 2016). 
Arguments similar to those put forward in this paper could also be used to demonstrate that psychological 
profiling threatens the autonomy of consumers, and that targeted advertising should thereby be outlawed. 
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2.1. Developing the intuitive account 
We can attain an elementary understanding of the concept of autonomy by studying its etymology. 
“Auto” means self, and “nomos” means governance. “Self-governance” loosely refers to other 
concepts such as self-legislation, self-determination, self-ownership, and personal sovereignty; all of 
which pertain to the notion of having control over one’s life (Ashley, 2012, p.1). My concern is solely 
with personal autonomy (the self-governance of an individual) rather than collective autonomy (the 
self-governance of a group). Personal autonomy can be attributed to a variety of objects: actions, 
decisions, and agents (an agent being a person that acts). Since I am discussing the status of voting 
decisions, I will usually speak in terms of whether or not an agent’s decision to act is autonomous. 
Nothing will turn upon this terminological point, however, since the objects of autonomy attribution 
are often interchangeable. That a decision to act is autonomous implies that the action based on 
that decision is autonomous, from which it also follows that the agent performing the action is (at 
least at that particular time) acting autonomously. 
It must also be noted that I am not discussing the notion of Kantian autonomy; under which, to be 
autonomous, an agent must not be motivated by their personal beliefs and desires. Many 
contemporary theorists hold instead that the inner mental world of the agent does play a vital role 
in self-governance (Christman, 1991; Dworkin, 1988; Frankfurt, 1988). Under this conception of 
personal autonomy, an agent is autonomous if she is capable of governing herself so that the desires 
that motivate her choices are those “by which one genuinely wants to be motivated, rather than … 
by unconscious prejudices, compulsive obsessions, or the like” (Anderson, 2008, p.8). An important 
intuition here is that most adults, most of the time, should be described as autonomous; as having 
the ability to decide for themselves which actions to perform. As Gerald Dworkin (1988, p.31) notes, 
“any feature that is going to be fundamental in moral thinking must be a feature that persons share.” 
A satisfactory descriptive account of autonomy must thereby delineate the conditions that must be 
present in order for us to ascribe autonomy to agents. At the same time, these conditions must not 
be so stringent that they exclude everyday cases of self-governance.  
Since my thesis is that psychological profiling should be outlawed because it threatens autonomy, it 
presupposes the importance of autonomy. It is not controversial to claim that autonomy is valuable. 
When we ascribe value to something, we either do so intrinsically (x is valuable for its own sake) or 
instrumentally (x is valuable because it is a means to some other end that has intrinsic value). 
Autonomy certainly has instrumental value; if agents are able to exercise their autonomy, then they 
are able to pursue whatever course of life they think is best for them (Wall, 2003). But it is not the 
case that self-governance is only one means, among many possible separate means, of achieving 
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well-being. Rather, it seems that self-governance is a necessary element of well-being (Mill, 2003, 
p.121) and that autonomy therefore also has intrinsic value. We describe slavery as oppressive  and 
abhorrent precisely because it is a life in which individuals are not sovereign over their own actions. 
Thus, the opportunity to determine and carry out one’s life plans seems necessarily constitutive of a 
good life. John Christman (2009) explains why one has an inherent interest in being able to govern 
one’s own actions, rather than those actions being governed by external forces: 
“to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, 
conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part 
of what can somehow be considered one's authentic self. Autonomy in this sense seems an 
irrefutable value, especially since its opposite — being guided by forces external to the self 
and which one cannot authentically embrace — seems to mark the height of oppression”. 
 
The intrinsic value of autonomy is also used as justification for one of the fundamental tenets of 
political liberalism.2 The principle of state neutrality holds that, since societies are composed of 
citizens with different values, the state should refrain from “endorsing any particular comprehensive 
conception of the good life and what is truly valuable” (O’Shea, 2011, p.25). This principle is 
supposed to prevent undue external interference by the state with the autonomous decisions of its 
citizens. The value of autonomy is thus thought to protect citizens from both the perfectionist 
conviction that they ought to extol particular values, and paternalistic laws which enforce such 
values upon them.3 Therefore, for both moral and political reasons, autonomy is taken to be 
valuable for its own sake.  
Since autonomy is valuable part of human life, it is important for us to be able to accurately 
distinguish between autonomous and non-autonomous actions. The layman might equate autonomy 
with freedom, but it is not the case that an agent is autonomous merely because they have the 
physical or legal freedom to act upon their desires. Autonomy refers (at least primarily, if not 
exclusively) to the inner mental world of individual agents, rather than the external state of affairs 
that agents are situated in. For example, it is possible for an agent to be physically free, and yet non-
autonomous; imagine a person with bipolar disorder who makes impulsive choices during a manic 
episode. Conversely, an agent could lack physical freedom and yet be fully autonomous, such as a 
political prisoner who refuses to renounce his revolutionary views. Thus, an important facet of 
autonomy ascription is that an agent has the internal ability to decide for herself which actions to 
perform. This common sense intuition - that autonomy depends crucially on the internal mental 
conditions of the agent - is labeled by theorists as “internalism.” 
                                                          
2 Political liberalism is perceived to be the foundation of modern Western political thought. 
3 The relationship between the concept of autonomy and the justification of government policies is pertinent 
throughout this paper, especially where my version of “privacy paternalism” is considered. 
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Tom Beauchamp’s (2009, p.65) analysis of autonomy begins with three assumptions regarding the 
internal mental conditions of autonomous agents - that they act (1) intentionally, (2) with 
understanding, and (3) voluntarily. Although this paper is not concerned with Beauchamp’s own 
separate theory of autonomy, the three intuitions he identifies help us determine the common 
sense view of the concept. I concur with Beauchamp (2009, p.62) that “any theory that classifies acts 
as nonautonomous when these acts are well understood, intentional, and not controlled by others is 
a conceptually dubious theory of autonomy.” Since the aim of this section is merely to lay some 
preliminary building blocks for my theory of autonomy, I will paint these intuitions in as simple and 
uncontroversial way as possible here. Throughout the course of my analysis of autonomy, they will 
be scrutinised in more detail (the condition of voluntariness in particular). 
(1) Intentionality. We have the intuition that autonomous actions involve intentionality. That an 
action is intentional means that the agent meant to carry out the action – she had a plan involving 
the reason for the action and the hoped effects of the action. Intentional actions can be contrasted 
with accidental actions. Take Donald Davidson’s (1963) famous example of a burglar who is startled 
when the homeowner happens to switch on her kitchen light. Intuitively, the homeowner’s turning 
on of the light was an autonomous action, but her alerting of the burglar was not. The difference 
between intentional and non-intentional acts depends on the beliefs and desires of the agent. The 
homeowner desired to turn on the light, and believed that her action would turn on the light. She 
did not believe that, or desire for, her action to alert the burglar. Thus, it seems that, to be 
autonomous, an agent must choose to perform an action on the basis of internal reasons such as 
beliefs, desires and values. 
(2) Understanding. Relatedly, some sort of appropriate understanding of one’s action is required for 
autonomy. The homeowner understood that flicking the switch would cause the light to come on, 
but she did not understand that flicking the switch would cause the burglar to be alerted. For an 
action to be described as autonomous, then, an agent must understand the nature and 
consequences of her actions. It does not appear, however, that an exhaustive level of understanding 
is requisite for autonomy. Many people autonomously drive their cars without fully comprehending 
what is going on underneath the bonnet. So, intuitively, what is necessary for autonomy is merely 
some sort of minimal understanding of the pertinent information related to one’s action. 
(3) Voluntariness. Imagine that, as the homeowner enters the room, the burglar puts a gun to her 
head and commands her to turn on the light. In this case, her action is not autonomous. This is 
because her decision to turn on the light is not a free and voluntary choice – it is influenced by the 
burglar’s demand. Influence occurs when one's beliefs, desires or actions are affected by others. If 
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an agent’s action has been influenced by someone else, we often describe them as non-autonomous. 
But this is not always the case. Sometimes, a choice can be influenced, and yet still appear to be 
voluntary and autonomous. Influence can be understood as comprising of three subcategories – 
coercion, persuasion and manipulation (Beauchamp, 2009, p.69). Coercion, which often involves a 
threat of physical violence (like the burglar’s above), is a relatively obvious form of influence that I 
will not pay much attention to here. A more interesting topic involves the blurred lines between 
persuasive and manipulative influences. Persuasive influences seem compatible with voluntariness, 
and thereby with autonomy. An agent can be persuaded to change their mind on the basis of a 
reasoned argument. For example, one can influence a friend’s decision to become vegetarian by 
appealing to their pre-existing desire to protect the environment. Intuitively, if their subsequent 
decision to become vegetarian is a voluntary choice based on consciously entertained reasons, we 
describe such a change of heart as autonomous, despite the external influence. On the other hand, 
manipulation - influence that involves lies or deceit - seems incompatible with voluntariness, and 
thereby with autonomy. In one of Shakespeare’s (1999) famous plays, Othello decided to murder 
Desdemona for revenge, because Iago deceitfully convinced him that she had been unfaithful (when 
she had not). Here, Othello’s decision to commit murder was not fully voluntary; he did not appear 
to be in complete control of his actions. Thus, voluntariness (and thereby an absence of 
manipulation) seems necessary for autonomy.  
A common sense, intuitive account of autonomous action thus requires that agents act intentionally, 
with understanding, and voluntarily. Is this intuitive account of autonomy sufficient for our 
understanding of the concept? I argue that it is not. Amy seemed to be acting intentionally, with 
understanding, and voluntarily. Yet she also appeared, intuitively, not to be fully in control of her 
actions. In light of cases such as these, where the distinction between persuasive and manipulative 
influence is uncertain, our intuitions about autonomy must be supplemented with other, more 
theoretical considerations.  
2.2. Assessing Amy’s autonomy using the intuitive account 
Should Amy’s decision to vote for the populist politician be deemed autonomous or non-
autonomous? Employing Beauchamp’s intuitive criteria for autonomy, it seems like Amy does act 
intentionally, with understanding, and voluntarily. Certainly, Amy’s vote was an intentional action. 
We saw that she internalised the politician’s opinions, identifying with them herself. Thus, at the 
time of her placing the vote, the xenophobic opinions which motivated this action did in an 
important sense belong to Amy. Furthermore, the action was not accidental; her pencil did not slip 
in the voting booth. She believed that going to the polling station and putting her cross in the 
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relevant box would enable her to vote for the populist, and she had a corresponding desire to do so. 
She performed the action on the basis of those internal reasons.  
Did Amy understand the nature and consequences of her actions? Granted, she did not have an 
exhaustive understanding of the consequences of her vote; none of us can predict the future, 
especially not in the political realm. But she surely did have the appropriate minimal level of 
understanding that we intuitively deemed as requisite for autonomous action. She understood that 
by voting for the populist, she was increasing the chances of his election. Furthermore, she 
understood that his election would lead to the implementation of some of his xenophobic policies.  
Was Amy’s vote voluntary? Nobody physically or coercively forced Amy to vote for the populist. Of 
course, her decision was influenced by the campaign team, but does that influence count as 
autonomy-conferring persuasion or autonomy-undermining manipulation? It is not unreasonable to 
argue that Amy was merely persuaded. The campaign team did not plant a chip in Amy’s brain that 
radically changed her beliefs and desires. They did not even lie to her in order to influence her 
decision. Rather, they identified the issues in which Amy had already expressed an interest, and used 
them to persuade her of their case, much like the example of the vegetarian who appealed to the 
environmental concerns of her friend to persuade him to stop eating meat. Since we deemed that 
decision to become vegetarian as autonomous, it looks as though we must also deem Amy’s voting 
decision likewise.  
Despite all these considerations, however, the conclusion that Amy’s decision was autonomous 
remains dubious. On the contrary, her decision appears to have been non-autonomous, primarily 
because, as I will argue in the following sections, the influence of the psychological profiling team 
should be deemed manipulative rather than persuasive. Therefore, our intuitions surrounding the 
concept of autonomy (and in particular the condition of voluntariness) are insufficient for a 
complete understanding of autonomy.  
2.3. The problem with the intuitive account 
Given the ambiguity surrounding the intuition that autonomy requires voluntariness, the intuitive 
account is unable to accurately distinguish between manipulation and persuasion. In this section, I 
propose that including the condition of authenticity as a necessary component of autonomy enables 
us to make such a distinction. 
Recall that (aside from accidental or subconscious actions) agents usually perform actions on the 
basis of intentions to act. In this sense, one has an unyielding authority over one’s own actions. So 
 10 
 
long as one’s physical body is not strapped to a robotic frame controlled by a mad scientist, it is 
impossible for one’s actions to be caused by an intention to act that does not belong to oneself. But 
this necessary authority that one’s intentions to act wield over one’s actions does not guarantee 
one’s autonomy. This is because the mental states that motivate one’s intentions to act may 
themselves have been influenced by external factors. One’s actions themselves cannot be directly 
influenced by anything other than one’s own intentions; but the beliefs, desires and values that 
motivate one’s intentions and thereby govern one’s actions are capable of being influenced. In this 
way, one’s power to determine how to act – one’s autonomy - can be compromised (Buss, 2013). 
For example, Amy was not physically coerced into performing the action of voting for the populist, 
but her desire to act in this way was clearly influenced. 
Recall that influence occurs when one's beliefs, desires or actions are affected by external forces, 
rather than oneself. But all of the desires that motivate one’s actions are influenced, to some extent, 
by things external to oneself.4 Autonomy ascription depends on distinguishing between those 
influences upon action that are compatible with autonomy, and those that threaten autonomy. 
More specifically, it involves “distinguishing those ways of influencing people’s reflective and critical 
faculties which subvert them from those which promote and improve them” (Dworkin, 1988, p.18, 
emphasis added). We have seen that persuasive influences are compatible with autonomy, while 
manipulative influences are not. Thus, a satisfactory descriptive account of autonomy must provide 
us with the tools to distinguish between persuasive and manipulative influences. 
This distinction depends in turn upon the ability to draw a clear conceptual line between those 
desires that we describe as part of an agent’s “authentic” self, and those which an agent cannot 
authentically embrace.5 Autonomy requires not only that we are able to consciously act on the basis 
of reasons, but also that these reasons reflect our true selves. For an agent’s decision to be 
autonomous, it must be “authentic” – it must “genuinely express a person’s identity, commitments 
or goals” (O’Shea, 2012, p.9).6 To understand this idea of authenticity, consider the example of a 
drug addict who sincerely desires to become clean, but continues to use the drug nonetheless. She 
obviously fails to govern herself, but, under Beauchamp’s criteria, it is difficult to explain exactly why 
this is so. Her action appears, we can imagine, to be performed intentionally, with understanding, 
and voluntarily. Intentionality is present because the desire to use does not destroy the authority 
                                                          
4 For brevity, I will focus on desires, but the reader should bear in mind that my argument applies equally to 
other motivating mental states such as beliefs and values. 
5 The connection between autonomy and authenticity was first introduced by Gerald Dworkin (1976, pp.24-25). 
6 Of course, the requirement of authenticity assumes that people are capable of possessing such “authentic” 
qualities. Readers sceptical of such an assumption should consider something they care about very deeply; the 
love for one’s family, for example. It would be difficult to describe actions motivated by this value as anything 
but a genuine expression of one’s identity, commitments and goals.  
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that the addict had over her decision to act. We can also suppose that she fully understood the 
nature and consequences of the action at the time which she performed it. And the action can be 
described as voluntary, since it was not the case that somebody forced her to inject herself under 
duress of physical violence; she did it by herself, alone in her room. 
What is missing from the intuitive account is a distinction between authentic and inauthentic desires. 
As a long term life goal, the addict wants to stop using drugs. This desire can be described as 
authentically hers; she fully and genuinely identifies with it. But she also has a strong, immediate 
urge to use again. This desire is inauthentic; she often rejects this desire, and wishes that it did not 
motivate her actions. Inauthentic desires are often alienating in this way because they are the 
product of some manipulative or oppressive external force; in this case, the addictive power of the 
drug. We would not ascribe autonomy to the agent if she continued to use the drug, since her desire 
to use is an inauthentic one. We would ascribe autonomy to the agent if she stopped herself from 
using the drug, since this is what she authentically wants. Consideration of the authenticity of the 
addict’s desires explains why the fact that the addict’s actions are motivated by the desire to use, 
rather than the desire to stop using, leads us to claim that her autonomy has been undermined.  
So, for an action to be autonomous, it must have been motivated by an authentic desire. Introducing 
authenticity as a necessary condition of autonomy provides us with a tool for distinguishing between 
legitimate persuasive influences upon desires, and unwarranted manipulative influences upon 
desires. Desires influenced by persuasion are authentic, whereas desires influenced by manipulation 
are inauthentic. For example, if Amy’s desire to vote for the populist was not influenced by 
psychological profiling, and was instead formed solely as a consequence of persuasive arguments 
made by her friends, then she would be likely to authentically identify with that desire. As we have 
seen, however, Amy felt alienated from her desire to vote for the populist. Since she did not fully 
and genuinely identify with it, the desire must be deemed inauthentic. And since this inauthentic 
desire was caused by the psychological profiling team, their influence must be deemed manipulative 
rather than persuasive.  
The problem of authenticity, then, denotes the difficulties theorists face in describing exactly what it 
is that makes a desire authentic, rather than inauthentic. In the next section, I will argue that a 
particular theoretical account of autonomy provides a convincing answer to this problem. 
3. A hierarchical account of autonomy 
The first claim of my thesis is that the use of psychological profiling to influence voting decisions can 
violate autonomy. To assess this claim, a theoretical account of autonomy is required, which also 
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captures our pre-theoretical intuitions regarding the concept. In this section, I argue that an answer 
to the problem of authenticity can be provided by a particular version of a hierarchical account of 
autonomy. I begin by exposing the flaws in Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical account. This enables us to 
see the strengths of John Christman’s account, which, I argue, provides a convincing solution to the 
problem of authenticity. 
The basic premise of all hierarchical accounts is that our mental lives are structured in a certain way: 
we have both lower-order desires and higher-order desires. A lower-order desire is a mere desire 
regarding the actions of an agent; a desire to do X. A higher-order desire is a more considered desire, 
because it is about lower-order desires; a desire to desire to do X (Ashley, 2012, p.14). The 
implication of this is that one's higher-order desires reveal what one authentically wants; that they 
are the site of one’s “true self” (Anderson, 2008, p.10). According to hierarchical accounts, then, 
actions motivated by lower-order desires must ultimately be guided by authentic higher-order 
desires, if they are to be deemed autonomous.  
3.1. Structural hierarchicalism 
Harry Frankfurt (1988) developed the first hierarchical account. His answer to the problem of 
authenticity is that autonomy involves the “reflective endorsement” of one’s lower-order desires in 
light of one’s higher-order desires. If my action is motivated by lower-order desires that I endorse in 
light of my higher-order desires, then I am acting autonomously. If my action is motivated by lower-
order desires that contradict my higher-order desires, then I am acting non-autonomously. Thus, for 
Frankfurt, endorsement is a form of authentication. For example, the addict may have a lower-order 
desire to use drugs, but this desire cannot be authentically endorsed in light of her higher-order 
desire to not be a drug addict. If at any moment the addict wants to use drugs, then she wants at 
that moment what she does not authentically want, and is thereby non-autonomous. Thus, 
autonomy consists of both the ability to authentically identify with one’s lower-order desires (by 
reflecting upon their coherence with one’s higher-order desires), and the ability to reject (or refuse 
to act upon) those lower-order desires that contradict one’s higher-order desires.  
This approach might appear plausible at first glance. It accounts for the familiar way in which we 
sometimes, upon reflection, choose to reject our own desires. It also captures the common malaise 
we experience when deciding between doing what we want to do, and doing what we know we 
should do. However, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that Frankfurt’s approach cannot explain 
the difference between authentic higher-order desires and manipulated higher-order desires. 
Although an agent’s ability to reflect upon their higher-order desires seems necessary for autonomy 
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ascription, this does not, as Dworkin (1988, p.18, emphasis added) writes, tell the “whole story of 
autonomy…the choice of the kind of person one wants to become may be influenced by other 
persons or circumstances in such a fashion that we do not view those evaluations as being the 
person’s own.” A good account of autonomy must be capable of identifying and excluding higher-
order desires that have been shaped by manipulative influences. 
Frankfurt’s hierarchical account is labelled “structuralist” (Buss, 2016), since it sees autonomy as 
resting solely on the way that an agent’s desires are structured. Structuralist accounts are weak 
because they ignore the fact that agents are “diachronic”; they exist over a long period of time. 
Frankfurt’s approach assesses the structural relationship between an agent’s desires at a particular 
time, and does not take into account their historical origins. For example, under Frankfurt’s account, 
Amy’s voting decision would be described as autonomous. Frankfurt would assess Amy’s desires at 
the moment of action, and determine that her lower-order desire to mark her ballot paper by 
putting a cross next to the populist’s name was endorsed by her higher-order desire to vote for the 
populist. Because of this endorsement, Frankfurt would hold that Amy’s lower-order desire to mark 
her ballot paper in that way was authentic, and that her action was thereby autonomous.  
But this conclusion is counterintuitive. At the moment of action, Amy did genuinely desire to put her 
cross in the populist’s box. However, we do not accept that the higher-order desire to vote for the 
populist which caused her to form the lower-order desire to mark the ballot paper was one of her 
authentic desires. Amy’s power to decide how to behave had been manipulated by an antecedent 
factor, namely, the psychological profiling team, which caused her desire to vote for the populist. 
Accurate autonomy ascription cannot be achieved solely through an assessment of the conditions 
surrounding an action at the time which it is performed. Since Frankfurt’s account does not consider 
how higher-order desires are generated, it cannot distinguish between cases in which one’s higher-
order desires are authentic, and cases in which one’s higher-order desire has been manipulated by 
an external force. Thus, Frankfurt’s account cannot solve the problem of authenticity. 
3.2. Proceduralist hierarchicalism 
Another type of hierarchical account, developed by John Christman, offers a more promising 
solution to the problem of authenticity. Christman, like Frankfurt, holds that higher-order desires are 
capable of expressing one’s authentic, autonomous considerations. However, unlike Frankfurt, he 
does not assume that manipulation is absent if a lower-order desire is endorsed by a higher-order 
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desire.7 In order to account for the possibility of manipulated higher-order desires, Christman shifts 
the focus away from the endorsement of a desire at the moment of action, and onto the historical 
process of desire formation. Thus, his account is described as “proceduralist” rather than merely 
“structuralist” (Buss, 2016). Instead of requiring that an agent must reflectively endorse her desire in 
order to be autonomous with respect to it, proceduralism requires that an agent must reflectively 
endorse the process by which she ended up coming to have that desire.  
For Christman (1991, p.11), an agent is autonomous relative to some desire (at time t) if and only if:  
i) The agent did not resist the development of the desire (prior to t) when attending to this 
process of development, (or would not have resisted that development, had she 
attended to the process). 
ii) The lack of resistance to the development of the desire (prior to t) did not take place (or 
would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. 
iii) The self-reflection involved is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. 
 
The first condition pinpoints the historical process of desire formation as crucial for determining 
authenticity. The second and third conditions impose limits upon an autonomous agent’s cognitive 
capacities. An agent who meets all three conditions acts upon the basis of an authentic desire, and 
must thereby be deemed autonomous. 
Considering the first condition, an agent “attends to” the development of a desire when she is able 
to fully consider a complete description of the causal processes that led her to have this desire. 
Imagine that our reluctant addict, recently released from rehab, pays conscious attention to the 
formation of a resurgent lower-order desire to use the drug. She becomes aware of her physical 
cravings and an inner mental conflict between two opposing desires. She consciously entertains her 
higher-order desire not to use the drug, and thereby attempts to resist the process by which she 
forms the lower-order desire to use. Thus, under Christman’s first condition, her lower-order desire 
to use is inauthentic, and her eventual use of the drug constitutes a non-autonomous action.  
It is important to note that the question of whether or not an agent resists the desire formation 
process can also be considered hypothetically. The addict was able to fully attend to the 
development of her desire, but in most cases, agents form desires without full comprehension of the 
causal steps that lead to them. For example, recall that Amy posted xenophobic messages on social 
                                                          
7 To give credit to Frankfurt (1987), he identifies that this assumption is flawed. As a solution, he suggests that 
autonomous endorsement must be “wholehearted,” in the sense that the agent’s endorsement is devoid of all 
doubt. But this account is unconvincing, because it seems to permit cases of self-deception (Anderson, 2008, 
pp.11-15; Taylor, 2008, p.7). 
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media. Suppose that she developed this lower-order desire to share xenophobic content because 
she had a higher-order desire to be accepted by her peers, who would approve of such posts. Since 
Amy was not consciously aware of the way in which her desire to post the messages was formed, we 
must consider whether she would have resisted the formation of the desire if she had paid conscious 
attention to it. And given Amy’s higher-order desire to gain acceptance among her peers is a genuine 
and authentic one, we can reason hypothetically that the desire formation process would be 
acceptable to her, and that her decision to post xenophobic messages was thereby autonomous.  
There are other cases, however, where despite the fact that an agent accepts the desire formation 
process, that desire should nevertheless be deemed inauthentic. I am talking here about cases in 
which a manipulative influence is responsible for the agent having accepted the process by which 
the desire in question was formed. Hence the second condition, which holds that a desire is not 
authentic if the agent’s acceptance of it was caused by “factors that inhibit self-reflection”. 
Ultimately, for Christman (1991, p.11), “autonomy is achieved when an agent is in a position to be 
aware of the changes and development of her character and of why these changes come about. This 
self-awareness enables the agent to foster or resist such changes.” That self-reflection requires the 
ability to both become aware of and resist the desire formation process aligns with our intuitions 
that autonomy requires both understanding and voluntariness. For a desire to be deemed authentic, 
we must hypothesise that a minimally rational agent would understand (by being “aware of”) and 
voluntarily accept (by not “resisting”) the process by which it was formed. The inference I have made, 
on the basis of Christman’s account, is that desires are only authentic if the agent both understands 
and voluntarily accepts (or would accept) the influences that led him to accept it. To put the point in 
another way, we could say that an agent’s desire is authentic if they provide (or would provide) their 
“informed consent” to the influences that caused it. 
Here, the advantage of proceduralism over structuralism can be highlighted. Christman, unlike 
Frankfurt, seems able to distinguish between cases in which one’s higher-order desires are authentic, 
and cases in which one’s higher-order desire has been manipulated by an external force. For 
example, the prospective vegetarian understood the nature of his friend’s attempt to influence his 
desires, and he voluntarily and consciously chose not object to this influence. Thus, his desire to stop 
eating meat was authentic. But in other cases, an absence of understanding necessarily precludes 
the possibility of actual voluntariness. Othello did reflect on some of the reasons behind his desire to 
kill Desdemona (such as his belief that she was unfaithful) and he found those reasons acceptable. 
However, Othello did not have access to the full story behind the development of his desire, because 
he was unaware of Iago’s manipulative influence. Since Othello’s acceptance of the process by which 
 16 
 
he formed the desire to murder was influenced by Iago, his reflection upon that process does not 
meet Christman’s second condition of competence; he was under the influence of factors that 
inhibit self-reflection. Furthermore, we can hypothesise that if Othello had been aware of Iago’s 
deception, he surely would have rejected the desire to kill Desdemona. Thus, the case also fails to 
meet the hypothetical strand of Christman’s first condition. We can thereby infer from Christman’s 
account that Othello’s desire to kill Desdemona was inauthentic, and his subsequent action was non-
autonomous.  
Aside from manipulation, there are other factors that could prevent agents from providing their 
informed consent to the way that their desires are formed. Christman’s third condition addresses 
this issue. The third condition, like the second, ensures that autonomous agents have the necessary 
cognitive capacities to adequately reflect upon the development of their desires. But while the 
second condition ensures that the agent’s mental states are free from external influences, the 
purpose of the third condition is to ascertain that the agent employs the correct techniques of 
reasoning when attending to the desire development process. If an agent attends to that process, 
but does so irrationally, then their acceptance of the process would not suffice for the desire to be 
deemed authentic.  
A common worry with rationality requirements is that they are often too stringent. An overly 
demanding rationality requirement would imply that agents are not autonomous if they fail to make 
decisions that maximise their own well-being. But the human capacity to reason analytically is often 
overestimated (Kahneman, 2011), and stringent rationality conditions would thus contradict our pre-
theoretical intuition that most people are autonomous most of the time. Therefore, an acceptable 
account of autonomy must allow autonomous agents the space to make sub-optimal or unwise 
choices. Even the seemingly minimal stipulation that a belief must be coherent with one’s wider set 
of beliefs is too demanding; it is not clear whether anyone’s set of beliefs is entirely devoid of 
conflict. Thus, Christman’s condition of minimal rationality requires only that an agent does not 
consciously and concurrently entertain desires that obviously conflict; such as desiring to both use 
and not use a drug. If one is consciously aware of such a “manifestly inconsistent” (Christman, 1991, 
p.15) contradiction within their reasoning, and yet still acts on the basis of such reasoning, then they 
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are either reflecting irrationally, or they are partaking in self-deception. Neither of these processes 
are compatible with autonomy.8  
I have outlined Christman’s three conditions for autonomy. In the next section, I will show how this 
account helps us answer the question of whether Amy’s desire to vote for the populist is authentic. 
3.3. A solution to the problem of authenticity 
The intuitive account struggled with the question of whether the influence of the profiling team 
upon Amy’s desires was manipulative or persuasive. Since this means that it failed to determine the 
authenticity of Amy’s desire to vote for the populist, the intuitive account was incapable of 
accurately ascertaining whether or not her voting decision was autonomous. Christman’s 
authenticity conditions enable us to identify the influence of the profiling team upon Amy’s voting 
decision as manipulative, thereby allowing us to make sense of the intuition that her decision was 
non-autonomous. 
Of course, Amy meets Christman’s third condition, since it is presumed ex hypothesi that she is 
minimally rational and not self-deceiving. But she does not meet the other two conditions for 
authenticity. Recall that Amy developed her desire to vote for the populist after the phone call with 
the psychological profiling team. It is true that she did not resist the development of the desire at 
the time. But, under Christman’s account, a simple absence of resistance is not enough to secure 
authenticity. It is only the case that Amy’s desire to vote for the populist was authentic if she 
provided (or would have provided) her “informed consent” to the influences that caused it. 
It is clear, however, that reflection-inhibiting factors prevented Amy from properly consenting to the 
influence of the profiling team. Amy did not fully understand the causes of her desire, and was 
thereby unable to voluntarily resist the influence of the profiling team. As far as Amy was concerned, 
the caller had access to, at the most, very minimal personal information about her. She was not 
aware that the team had access to her private Facebook messages, her Twitter comments, her 
purchase history, and so on. She did not know that this data had been aggregated into a model of 
her beliefs and desires more accurate than even she would be able to manufacture herself. She was 
unaware that psychologists provided information and cues to the caller in order to influence her 
                                                          
8 The concepts of self-deception and manipulation might appear entangled; both involve a process whereby an 
agent’s higher-order desires are overruled. The difference is that during self-deception, the agent actively and 
consciously engages in this process, whereas during manipulation, the agent is passive and unaware. 
Christman’s requirement that self-deception must be absent is largely irrelevant for my project. I focus on 
cases of psychological profiling, in which passive agents are unaware of an external influence upon their 
reasoning. Thus, the presumption that agents are not deceiving themselves is implicit in the following 
examples and discussion.  
 18 
 
voting decision. Amy’s ignorance of these factors clearly inhibited her potential for reflection, 
thereby violating the second criterion for autonomy. Furthermore, we can hypothesise that if Amy 
had been free from these reflection inhibiting factors, and able to fully attend to the process of 
desire formation, she would have been shocked to discover the way in which her desire had been 
formed, and felt alienated from it. She would not regard this influence as merely a benign and 
persuasive one; she would surely deem it to have been malign and manipulative. For these reasons, 
a fully informed Amy would have repudiated the desire formation process.9 Therefore, her desire to 
vote for the populist must be deemed inauthentic, and her consequent decision to place the vote 
was thereby not autonomous.  
Christman’s account of autonomy provides a solution to the problem of authenticity, and thus 
enables us to explain that the profiling team manipulated Amy’s vote and rendered it non-
autonomous. So far, I have argued in support for the first claim of my thesis; that psychological 
profiling violates autonomy. In the remainder of this paper, I will turn my attention to the second 
claim of my thesis; that psychological profiling should be outlawed.  
4. Autonomy and paternalism 
I claim that it would be justifiable for the state to intervene in Amy’s life in order to prevent the 
profiling team from violating her autonomy. Such an intervention would be “paternalistic,” because 
it aims to improve Amy’s situation by interfering with her actions. In this section, I will show that 
Christman’s account of autonomy permits paternalistic interventions, but only when they do not 
overrule autonomous decisions. Therefore, under Christman’s account of autonomy, although a 
specific intervention with Amy’s non-autonomous decision would be acceptable, a blanket ban on 
psychological profiling would not. Firstly, in order to clarify Christman’s attitude towards paternalism, 
I will explain the “internalist” and “content neutral” features of his account of autonomy. Secondly, a 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” paternalism will be made. Then, I argue in favour of a “privacy 
paternalism” policy, that would prevent psychological profiling teams from manipulating voting 
decisions. Finally, I concede that such a policy would constitute a “hard” paternalistic intervention, 
and would therefore be rejected by Christman. 
                                                          
9 In section 1, I described how Amy repudiated her desire to vote for the populist two years after the event. In 
that example, one could object that Amy might still have authentically desired to elect the populist when she 
placed her vote, and that she only regretted her decision two years later. However, this was merely a 
rhetorical, pre-theoretical device, employed to suggest that Amy’s attitude towards the desire changed when 
she was free from factors that inhibit self-reflection. Under Christman’s account, we ask instead whether Amy 
would have rejected the formation of her desire at the time at which it was formed, if she were able to 
properly attend to and reflect upon such a process. 
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4.1. Internalism, content neutrality and soft paternalism 
The way in which we define autonomy has important political consequences, since autonomy is 
often invoked in the justification or rejection of policies and laws. Christman holds that only a certain 
“soft” type of paternalistic law is justifiable. To understand why, we must first comprehend two 
features of his account of autonomy; it is “internalist” and “content neutral.”  
According to Christman, if a minimally rational agent accepts (or would accept) the process by which 
she formed her desire, and her acceptance of this process was itself not constrained by any 
inhibiting factors, then the desire is authentic, and any decisions she makes on the basis of this 
desire are autonomous. Autonomy requires only that these internal competency conditions  are met. 
That these conditions are met is determined by considering the agent’s psychology, rather than by 
reference to the external world. This exclusive focus on the psychological conditions of an agent is 
thus deemed “internalist.” Under Christman’s “proceduralist internalism” then, the content of what 
we value is irrelevant to autonomy. In assessing whether or not Amy’s voting decision was 
autonomous, we did not evaluate the merits of voting for the populist; we only considered the way 
in which the desire to vote for the populist was formed. Christman’s position, then, is also described 
as “content-neutral,” because autonomy ascription does not asses what we value, it only assesses 
how we come to value it. 
Content neutrality does not mean that value-talk is avoided entirely. It would be difficult to 
understand why the prospective vegetarian’s decision to stop eating meat is autonomous, for 
example, without appeal to his higher-order desire to protect the environment. Instead, Christman’s 
account is content-neutral in the sense that it refrains from appealing to values other than those 
that the agent in question endorses. In other words, it does not specify any particular values that an 
agent must endorse in order to be described as autonomous.10 Christman (2008) believes that an 
account of autonomy must be content neutral in order to ensure congruity with the aforementioned 
liberal principle of state neutrality, which holds that the state should refrain from promoting any 
particular conception of the good. This position implies that a law is only justified if it respects 
citizens’ autonomy, in the sense that the law does not impose upon citizens values that they reject. 
The principle of state neutrality is challenged by a position known as perfectionism, which holds that 
the state must promote certain values deemed objectively necessary for a good life. Perfectionism 
implies that laws based on such values are justified, even if the values are authentically rejected by 
citizens themselves. Perfectionists thereby also oppose content neutrality, because they claim that 
                                                          
10 This is why Christman’s third criterion places only very minimal standards of rationality upon autonomous 
agents – he believes that such standards are acceptable to all. 
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“some states of affairs are objective components of the person’s good independently of what the 
person desires” (Szerletics, 2011, p.13, emphasis added). For Christman, the perfectionist rejection 
of content neutrality entails a lack of respect for autonomy, because it legitimises unacceptably 
“paternalistic” laws and policies.  
Paternalism can be loosely defined as the interference, restriction or overriding of an agent’s freely 
made choices, for their own good. Paternalistic intervention is often thought to be in direct tension 
with autonomy, because it imposes certain values upon agents, thus denying them the ability to 
decide for themselves how best to pursue their own conception of the good. Yet there are at least 
some versions of paternalistic intervention which are compatible with a content-neutral conception 
of autonomy (Dworkin, 1972). Firstly, a paternalistic intervention is certainly reasonable when 
agents provide their explicit informed consent to it. If an agent has sufficient understanding of the 
nature and consequences of an intervention, and they voluntarily agree to such an intervention 
taking place, there does not seem to be any violation of autonomy. Imagine our recovering addict 
gives the state permission to coercively intervene with her life in the event of a relapse. Since the 
addict has autonomously and explicitly chosen to have her future influenced in this way, the 
intervention would not conflict with her capacity for self-governance. 
In other cases, paternalistic intervention can be justified when consent is not explicit but rather 
hypothetical. Hypothetical consent occurs when an agent is unable to provide their informed 
consent at the time of intervention, but it can be hypothesised that they would have consented had 
they been able to. For example, we can hypothesise that if Amy had been sufficiently informed, she 
would have wanted the state to prevent the profiling team from manipulating her voting decision. In 
cases in which either explicit or hypothetical consent justifies paternalistic intervention, it is clear 
that agents are not autonomous at the time of intervention. Such cases are thus labelled “soft” 
because they do not conflict with autonomy. Soft paternalism is relatively uncontroversial, and since 
it refrains from the perfectionist impulse to impose repudiated values upon autonomous agents, it is 
compatible with content-neutrality. 
While “soft” paternalism only permits interference with non-autonomous decisions, “hard” 
paternalism holds that sometimes, autonomous decisions can justifiably be overruled.11 Christman 
(2004, p.157) rejects hard paternalism. He claims that autonomy marks out the “parameters within 
which a person is immune from paternalistic intervention.” In other words, laws that interfere with 
autonomous decisions are incompatible with a respect for autonomy. For example, in an effort to 
reduce the population, China’s one child policy mandated coercive sterilisations and forced 
                                                          
11 The distinction between soft and hard paternalism was first made by Feinberg (1989, p.12). 
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abortions. In this case, a perfectionist conception of the good was imposed upon people who 
thought otherwise; that living in a society with a manageable population is more valuable than living 
in a society in which women enjoy reproductive autonomy. The government claimed that overruling 
their autonomous decisions was justified because a reduction in population was for the benefit of 
everyone. Under Christman’s content neutral account, such a policy would be unacceptable. As 
Christman’s account appears to defend people’s autonomy in this way, he claims that it sets the 
right sort of barriers against paternalism.12 
Since we deem Amy’s vote to be non-autonomous, any paternalistic intervention into her situation 
would be soft, because it would not be in tension with her autonomy. Consequently, even Christman 
would find such an intervention acceptable. In the next section, I propose a paternalistic law that 
would protect agents like Amy from being manipulated by psychological profiling.  
4.2. Anti-aggregation legislation 
What sort of intervention would have protected Amy’s autonomy? It is clear that her desire to vote 
was inauthentic because it had been manipulated by the psychological profiling team, and that this 
was possible because the team had access to Amy’s private personal data. Thus, legislation that aims 
to protect Amy’s autonomy would be concerned with the protection of Amy’s informational privacy. 
Informational privacy refers to one’s ability to have control over the access and use of one’s 
personal information. (Fried, 1990; Moore, 2003; Rachels, 1975; Westin, 1967). That others have 
access to certain types of one’s personal information may seem fairly harmless when this 
information is understood as part of a singular, encapsulated database (such as the information 
about one’s purchases from an online grocery store, one’s movements on public transport, or one’s 
Facebook “likes”). But Reiman (1995, p.34) notes the potential for harm once this data is aggregated; 
“as we look at each kind of information-gathering in isolation from the others, each may seem 
relatively benign,” but “when the whole complex is in place, its overall effect on privacy will be 
greater than the sum of the effects of the parts.” Aggregation makes “our lives as a whole visible 
from a single point, like the panopticon,” and this is what gives psychological profiles their 
manipulative power. Almost any large and varied combination of databases, containing seemingly 
unimportant personal data, can be used to create a psychological profile which reveals important 
private information. This information, as we have seen, can be used to manipulate our desires and 
thereby influence our actions in ways that render us non-autonomous. Ultimately, the more 
                                                          
12 The majority of liberal theorists reject hard paternalism, for similar reasons (Arneson, 1980; Dworkin, 1972; 
Feinberg, 1989; Goldman, 2012; Mill, 2003). 
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personal information that is available about an individual, the easier it is for their actions to be 
influenced by psychological profiling. Therefore, informational privacy protects autonomy, because 
it limits the ability of others to manipulate us. 
The profiling team had access to a vast amount of Amy’s personal data because, when signing up to 
online services, she gave her acquiescence to the sale of that data to third parties. It is clear, 
however, that she did not autonomously approve of the manipulation of her voting decision which 
occurred as a consequence of that initial agreement. Thus, a soft paternalistic law that prevents 
agents like Amy from non-autonomously waiving their informational privacy would be justified, since 
it would protect their autonomy. In fact, it appears that such legislation is already in place, at least 
within the European Union. Under the Data Protection Directive, “collecting and processing the 
personal data of individuals is only legitimate…where the individual concerned…has unambiguously 
given his or her consent, after being adequately informed” (European Commission, 2011). 
However, although the notion of explicit informed consent is evidently written into law, it has not 
been translated into practice. The reader will no doubt be familiar with the way in which digital 
services obtain the “informed consent” of their users. Before accessing a service, the user is 
presented with a long, complex body of text setting out the company’s data usage policy, and they 
cannot proceed until they click a button to signify that they have “read and agreed to the terms and 
conditions.” In doing so, they make a legal agreement, akin to signing a contract, regarding the use 
of their personal data. Legally, then, Amy provided her “informed consent” to the use of her data. 
But both the service provider and the user alike know that the consent obtained is often ambiguous 
at best. The complexity of the text means that users are clearly disincentivised from reading and 
understanding it, and are thereby incapable of providing their actual informed consent. Most privacy 
policies are above the reading level of the average person (Jensen and Potts, 2004). The average 
length of a set of terms and conditions on a website is 2,514 words (McDonald and Cranor, 2008, 
p.554), and the average internet user would have to spend 40 minutes each day for a whole year in 
order to read all of the policies he has agreed to (Ibid., p.563). These findings suggest that the 
current model for obtaining informed consent is impossible to achieve in practice, and that the 
burden of ensuring that privacy is protected cannot rest solely on the user. 
I propose an alternative model, inspired by a controversial article written by Anita Allen named 
“Coercing Privacy” (1999). Allen supports a position that could be labelled privacy paternalism; she 
makes the case that “government will have to intervene in private lives for the sake of privacy and 
values associated with it” (Ibid., p.755). In solidarity with Allen, my suggestion is that people should 
be forced into protecting their privacy, via a paternalistic law that bans companies from trading 
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personal data for the purposes of aggregation. Such a law would make psychological profiling 
impossible, and thereby protect citizens from manipulative forces which are capable of violating 
their autonomy. 
My proposed anti-aggregation legislation is paternalistic in an indirect way, because it punishes 
companies for trading data, rather than users for providing it. It would be wrong to directly prevent 
citizens from sharing their private information, because this action is sometimes beneficial rather 
than harmful. As Roessler (2015, p.143) notes, allowing companies access to one’s data “is 
convenient, helps people in their searches and in their purchases, enormously simplifies 
communication, and can generally help enrich people’s lives.” In many cases, when we choose to 
share our data with digital companies, our privacy and autonomy remains intact. For example, Amy 
might find it useful for the weather application on her smartphone to collect and store data about 
her previously visited locations. In this case, manipulation is only possible if the developers of the 
app are able to sell this data to third parties, who could then combine it with other data to create a 
psychological profile. If the developers were prohibited from selling Amy’s data, then the fact that 
they have access to it would not threaten her autonomy. Therefore, since we are concerned with 
protecting autonomy, the appropriate legislation is that which prevents companies from trading the 
personal data of its users for the purposes of aggregation. 
I have argued that a type of privacy paternalism, which I call anti-aggregation legislation, would 
prevent people from having their voting decisions manipulated and their autonomy violated by 
psychological profiling teams. Next, I will explain why my proposed legislation is a version of hard 
paternalism, and that it is thereby incompatible with Christman’s account of autonomy. 
4.3. A hard paternalistic intervention 
Application of the anti-aggregation legislation to Amy’s case would indeed constitute a soft 
paternalistic intervention, because it would not conflict with any of her autonomous decisions. 
However, in this section I explain that, since the anti-aggregation legislation would affect all 
members of society, it would conflict with some people’s autonomy. This entails that the anti-
aggregation legislation is unjustified, at least under Christman’s account of autonomy, because it 
would constitute a hard paternalistic intervention into some people’s lives. 
While the anti-aggregation legislation protects the autonomy of agents like Amy, who do not give 
their informed consent to psychological profiling, it violates the autonomy of other agents, who 
make fully autonomous decisions about their informational privacy. To see this, imagine another 
agent, Jamie, who had his voting decision manipulated in the same way as Amy. But Jamie knows 
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about the practice of psychological profiling. He understands that by trading his personal 
information for access to online services, he is very likely to have his decisions manipulated in the 
future, whether that be by a political campaign team, an advertising agency, or the government. 
Nevertheless, he decides that he is willing to expose himself to such manipulation in order to access 
online services for free. For Jamie, the cost is worth the benefit, so he makes the autonomous 
decision to allow psychological profiling teams access to his personal data.  
Many internet users make this decision; we knowingly trade our privacy (and thereby our autonomy) 
for convenience. A recent global survey on people’s attitudes towards privacy identified a “we want 
it all paradox” when it comes to the tension between privacy and convenience (The EMC 
Corporation, 2014). Only 27% of respondents said they were “willing to trade some privacy for 
greater convenience and ease online.” Yet 68% of respondents use social media accounts, allowing 
others access to huge amounts of one’s personal data. This discrepancy suggests that these people 
are either (often contrary to testimony) willing to autonomously trade privacy for convenience, or 
that they do so non-autonomously. As we have established, Amy would be placed in the non-
autonomous category. Jamie, on the other hand, is one of the 27% who proudly and autonomously 
chooses to trade privacy for convenience. Every time he signs up for a service, he reads and fully 
understands the terms and conditions, and thus provides his explicit informed consent to having his 
privacy and autonomy violated by way of psychological profiling.  
If the anti-aggregation legislation was enacted, then Jamie would no longer be able to trade his data 
in exchange for access to online services. This is because a consequence of the legislation would 
most definitely be that many online services would cease to be “free,” since revenue from targeted 
advertising would dry up considerably. Therefore, users will be required to pay if they want to access 
online services. This would indirectly prevent people like Jamie from autonomously choosing to 
trade privacy for convenience. Therefore, for soft paternalists such as Christman, the anti-
aggregation legislation would be impermissible, because it legitimates a hard paternalistic 
interference with the lives of people like Jamie. According to Christman, since Jamie autonomously 
chose to put himself in a situation whereby the profiling team could manipulate his voting decision, 
that voting decision itself must be deemed autonomous, because Jamie would accept the process by 
which the desire to vote was formed. And since we care about protecting Jamie’s autonomy, any 
hard paternalistic interference into this state of affairs would be unjustified.  
I will argue, however, that hard paternalism is compatible with a respect for autonomy, and that the 
anti-aggregation legislation is therefore justified. In doing so, I reject Christman’s account of 
autonomy, and develop an alternative. 
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5. The problem with Christman’s account 
In this section, I argue that Christman’s account is problematic because it defends the ability of 
agents to govern their lives as they please, even when they choose to put themselves in autonomy-
undermining situations. I conclude that Christman’s internalist and content neutral account of 
autonomy is unconvincing, and that an alternative must be developed. 
Consider the case of a housewife who has completely relinquished her autonomy to her husband.13 
She must follow his every command, and is beaten when she disobeys. Due to the imbalance of 
power, the husband can easily manipulate his wife into doing his bidding. For example, he convinces 
her that in order to prove her commitment, she must put herself at risk by continuously shoplifting 
bottles of alcohol for him to drink. The housewife thus has a lower-order desire to steal alcohol for 
her husband. Now, one might suppose that under Christman’s model, the housewife would, if she 
were minimally rational and free from debilitating influences upon her desires, reject the process by 
which she formed the desire to steal alcohol. Of course, if this were the case, then the desire would 
be inauthentic and her action thereby non-autonomous. Consequently, a soft paternalistic 
intervention to save her from this sorry state of affairs would be permitted, since she did not provide 
her informed consent to being manipulated by her husband in that way. This example thus mirrors 
Amy’s case, in that Amy did not provide her informed consent to being manipulated by the profiling 
team. 
Imagine further, however, that the housewife autonomously chose to enter into this manipulative 
relationship. This example now mirrors Jamie’s case, in that Jamie did provide his informed consent 
to being manipulated by the profiling team. Imagine that the housewife chose to marry her husband 
under conditions of minimal rationality, and free from debilitating influences upon her desires. 
Before the marriage, she understood his extreme patriarchal views and was aware of the 
implications that these views would have for her future autonomy. In fact, she even shares his 
higher-order religious belief that a wife must be subservient to her husband; she thus authentically 
desires to be subservient. Since the housewife’s decision to enter the relationship was autonomous, 
those who support content neutrality and oppose perfectionism are forced to defend this oppressive 
state of affairs. Only the perfectionist can say that the housewife should not value subservience, for 
this would be to promote a particular conception of the good life, independently of what the 
housewife herself desires. And only the hard paternalist can make the (intuitively credible) moral 
case that, for her own good, the housewife should be rescued from the physical and emotional 
abuse that she suffers on a daily basis. 
                                                          
13 This example is inspired by those given by Oshana (1988, pp.89-91) and Kristinsson (2000).  
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Furthermore, according to Christman, the housewife’s lower-order desire to steal alcohol is 
authentic (even though she came to possess it under conditions of manipulation) because she 
autonomously chose to place herself in a situation in which she would be manipulated. Even though 
the husband’s manipulative influence was responsible for her forming the desire to steal alcohol, 
Christman’s second condition - that autonomy depends upon an absence of debilitating factors - is 
not violated in this case. This is because, since she autonomously chose to be in a manipulative 
relationship, the housewife accepts the causal steps which led to the formation of that desire: 
“Insofar as a person has authentically embraced even (what we might call) oppressive social 
status or subservient roles, that person deserves respect insofar as her judgment about 
those roles has the same formal features as our own judgment about our own lives” 
(Christman, 2004, p.153). 
 
But this conclusion is counter-intuitive, because it labels a clearly non-autonomous agent as 
autonomous, and it prohibits a paternalistic intervention that seems very reasonable. Christman 
accepts these conclusions as an inescapable consequence of the need to ensure that the state 
cannot interfere with the autonomous decisions of its citizens. He claims that respect for autonomy 
is incompatible with perfectionism and hard paternalism. This is why, under Christman’s account, 
the anti-aggregation legislation is impermissible. Even though Jamie’s vote was manipulated by the 
psychological profiling team, intervention would be impermissible, because he autonomously chose 
to put himself in such a situation.  
Why does Christman’s account of autonomy entail such counter-intuitive conclusions? Recall that his 
account is internalist and content-neutral. It focuses solely on the process of desire formation, 
thereby avoiding evaluative perfectionist judgments about the content of agent’s decisions. But the 
case of the subservient housewife suggests that autonomy cannot simply be a matter of the internal 
mental states of the agent. The housewife met the conditions of authenticity and cognitive 
competence demanded by Christman, and yet her life is clearly not one of a self-governing, 
autonomous agent. The reason the internalist conception of autonomy fails to adequately explain 
the housewife’s case is because it does not consider the way in which her subservience limits her 
autonomy. Despite fitting the internal psychological criteria, the housewife’s external situation 
entails that she is non-autonomous. The fact that she wants to be subservient is irrelevant; the 
pertinent fact is that she is subservient (Oshana, 1998, p.90). A subservient life, by its very definition, 
is a life absent of self-governance, so an agent committed to subservience cannot  be described as 
autonomous. 
It thus seems that, in addition to internal psychology, autonomy also depends upon the absence of 
certain external factors which restrict an agent’s ability to have control over their life as a whole. 
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Christman’s conception of autonomy cannot accommodate external factors. Therefore, in the next 
section, I develop an alternative account of autonomy, under which hard paternalistic interventions 
in the lives of agents like the housewife and Jamie are compatible with a respect for their autonomy.  
6. An externalist-substantivist account of autonomy 
My account of autonomy has two features that make it distinct from Christman’s account. Rather 
than being exclusively internalist, my account is externalist, because it holds that autonomy depends 
on aspects outside of the psychology of the agent. And rather than being content-neutral, my 
account is “strongly substantive”; it holds that autonomy ascription must involve an evaluation of 
the content of an agent’s desires. In this section, I will explain both of these features in turn, before 
presenting my own set of conditions for autonomy. 
6.1. Externalism  
The example of the subservient housewife exposed the weaknesses of Christman’s account; it does 
not accurately ascribe autonomy, and it does not set the right sort of limits on paternalistic 
intervention. Therefore, in this section, I propose that we should adopt an alternative conception of 
autonomy, which avoids counter-intuitive autonomy ascription, and permits certain forms of hard 
paternalism. But how is it possible that a hard paternalistic intervention, which overrules an 
autonomous decision, engenders the protection of autonomy? In order to answer this question, a 
global perspective of autonomy must be adopted. 
Christman holds that autonomy should be ascribed at the local level, in the sense that an agent is 
autonomous if they accept the formation process of a particular desire at a particular time. The 
global perspective of autonomy, by contrast, considers the complete set of an agent’s higher-order 
desires over a longer period of time. Those who adopt this approach, such as Dworkin (1988, p.16), 
hold that Christman’s focus on the diachronic nature of agents does not go far enough. Agents exist 
for a lifetime; they form long-term plans and develop deeply held values; these things are 
constitutive of an agent’s identity. Thus, autonomy should be perceived on a global level, assessing 
the capacity of agents to realise their goals over the course of their whole lives. 
It must be said that Christman does not reject the concept of global autonomy outright. Rather he 
believes that it “is parasitic on the property of autonomy for isolated preferences and values” (1991, 
p.3), and that local autonomy is thereby the correct level for ascription. He points to cases in which 
locally non-autonomous agents (like Amy) “display all of the level-headedness and freedom of 
thought characteristic of autonomy” in all other aspects of their lives (Ibid.). Christman’s suggestion 
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appears to be that, given Amy’s failure to govern her actions whilst under the influence of the 
profiling team, those who adopt the global perspective are forced to counter-intuitively label her as 
a non-autonomous agent. The wider implication of this conclusion would be that a global 
perspective of autonomy narrows our ability to describe ordinary people as autonomous, and 
thereby conflicts with our intuitions about what a satisfactory descriptive account of autonomy must 
do.  
In response, one further point regarding the scope of autonomy can be made. Those who seek 
necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy are often tempted to label agents in a binary 
manner; agents are either autonomous, or non-autonomous. But this concept is not so black and 
white. Autonomy, like rationality or morality, is a skill that individuals develop to varying degrees 
(Anderson, 2008, p.8). Recall our pre-theoretical, intuitive conditions for autonomy. Granted, 
intentionality does appear to be binary; acts are either intentional or nonintentional. But the 
conditions of understanding and voluntariness can be satisfied to varying degrees (Beauchamp, 2009, 
p.70). The consequences of an action can be fully or partially understood; an action can be fully or 
partially voluntary. It is important to bear these considerations in mind when we partake in 
autonomy ascriptions. Autonomy is not a label that, once ascribed, sticks with agents for life. At 
different moments, under different circumstances, agents can be described as more or less 
autonomous. Similarly, the global and local perspectives on autonomy are not mutually exclusive; an 
agent who decides to kill himself may be described as autonomous in the local sense, but non-
autonomous in the global sense. This more complex understanding of the scope of autonomy 
enables an improved assessment of Amy’s autonomy. When under the influence of the psychological 
profiling team, Amy is locally non-autonomous. However, since she, ex hypothesi, displays all the 
characteristics of autonomy in other aspects of her life, it is appropriate to describe her as a globally 
autonomous individual.  
Despite these nuances, however, it remains the case that a satisfactory account of autonomy must 
delineate cut-off points that enable us to describe an agent as non-autonomous (Beauchamp, 2010 
p.71). In other words, there must be a threshold under which the classification of an action falls from 
minimally autonomous to non-autonomous. The cut-off point delineated by Christman’s account is 
that a minimally rational agent is autonomous if she accepts (or would accept) the process by which 
she formed her desire, and her acceptance of this process was itself not constrained by any 
debilitating factors. But, as we have seen, this boundary is too lenient; it implies that agents who 
once made a locally autonomous decision to relinquish their autonomy must continue to be 
described as fully autonomous individuals, despite their occurent oppression or manipulation.  
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Using the global perspective of autonomy, we can set a more rigorous boundary for autonomy 
ascription. When considering whether an agent’s decision ought to count as fully autonomous, we 
must ask whether that decision puts their global autonomy at risk. Even if an agent like Jamie or the 
subservient housewife autonomously chose (in the local sense) to put themselves into a 
manipulative situation, since such a situation violates their global autonomy, their decision is not 
fully autonomous. This  way of ascribing autonomy ascription is perfectionist; it holds that certain 
values are objectively necessary for autonomy, even if the values are authentically rejected by 
citizens themselves. For example, an autonomous agent must value a life devoid of subservience. 
This method of autonomy ascription is also thereby “externalist,” because it holds that autonomy 
involves value judgments to which the agent might not cede; values external to the agent. 
Externalism thus enables us to avoid Christman’s counter-intuitive conclusions that the housewife is 
autonomous when she steals alcohol for her husband, and that Jamie is autonomous when he acts 
upon his manipulated desire to vote for the populist.  
This externalist position, however, does not entail that internalism is false. My argument is only that 
an exclusive focus on internal conditions produces an incomplete account of autonomy. In other 
words, internal and external conditions are each necessary - but only jointly sufficient - for an agent 
to be deemed autonomous. External conditions supplement rather than replace Christman’s internal 
conditions of authenticity and cognitive competence. 
6.2. Substantivism 
My position does, however, have the implication that content neutrality must be jettisoned, because 
I claim that the actual content of what an agent values is relevant to autonomy. Such a position is 
labelled “substantive”, because, in contrast to Christman’s content neutral account, it adds 
normative substance to the conditions for autonomy (Ashley, 2012, pp.15-18). I argue in support of a 
“strong” substantive account, which evaluates the desires of autonomous agents, rather than a 
“weak” substantive account, which attempts to preserve the idea that an account of autonomy must 
be content neutral. 
“Weak” substantive accounts impose normative constraints on autonomy indirectly, by stipulating 
that certain internal mental capacities are necessary for autonomous judgement (Ashley, 2012, p.17). 
For example, Myers (cited in Benson, 2008, p.135) proposes that an autonomous agent must be 
capable of “introspection, communication, memory, imagination, analytical reasoning, ‘self-
nurturing’, resistance to pressures to conform, and political collaboration.” The purported benefit of 
weak substantive accounts is that these normative standards apply to the cognitive competencies of 
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the agent, rather than to the content of her values. Thus, autonomous agents are permitted to make 
choices which may appear to be wrong or bad for them, so long as their desire formation process 
meets those competency conditions. Supporters of weak substantivism thereby claim that this 
position achieves two goals (Ibid.). First, it is capable of supporting paternalistic intervention in cases 
like that of the subservient housewife. Second, it is capable of doing so without making a 
perfectionist claim about what the housewife should value. For example, under Myers’ account, 
since the subservient housewife failed to “resist pressures to conform”, she is in fact non-
autonomous, and a soft paternalistic intervention is thereby compatible with a respect for her 
autonomy. Furthermore, since this intervention is justified without reference to the content of the 
housewife’s desires, it is said to avoid a perfectionist judgment.  
Note, however, that the conditions proposed by Myers, instead of being “weak”,  are in fact rather 
stringent. Although stringent conditions for autonomy enable us to (correctly) label non-
autonomous agents like the subservient housewife as non-autonomous, they also lead us to 
(mistakenly) label some autonomous agents as non-autonomous. Consider Myers’ requirement that 
autonomous agents employ “analytical reasoning” when making decisions. This could entail that 
agents who partake in risky activities (such as gambling or skydiving) are irrational and thereby non-
autonomous. If Myers’ account of autonomy was used to inform policy decisions, then the state 
would be justified in outlawing such risky activities in order to protect autonomy. But this conclusion 
is counter-intuitive, and it also seems to conflict with the liberal principle of state neutrality. 
In an effort to avoid the problems caused by such overly demanding conditions for autonomy, 
Christman ensured that his rationality condition was extremely minimal (see section 3.2). Yet even 
Christman’s rationality condition imposes an indirect normative constraint upon autonomy, because 
any ascription of rationality, no matter how minimal, necessarily involves an evaluative judgment. 
Therefore, despite pretensions to the contrary, Christman’s account should also be described as 
weakly substantive. And, as we have seen, Christman’s (very weak) version of weak substantivism 
runs into problems of its own. Meyers’ conditions are too demanding; they label autonomous agents 
as non-autonomous. Conversely, Christman’s conditions are too weak; they label non-autonomous 
agents as autonomous. We should therefore be sceptical of the ability of accounts that impose 
normative constraints on autonomy indirectly to accurately distinguish between autonomous and 
non-autonomous agents.  
“Strong” substantive accounts, on the other hand, impose direct limits on the content of an 
autonomous agent’s desires. It may appear that such a perfectionist position is incompatible with 
respect for autonomy, since it permits hard paternalistic laws which prohibit locally autonomous 
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agents from acting on the basis of certain values. However, Robert Young’s (1981) version of strong 
substantivism avoids this criticism, because it appeals directly to autonomy itself. He argues that, 
since autonomy is intrinsically valuable, we are committed to “defending, preserving and enhancing 
it” (Ashley, 2012, p.16). It is therefore unacceptable to allow agents to relinquish their autonomy, as 
Jamie does when he allows his personal data to be sold to psychological profiling organisations. The 
global perspective makes this externalist criterion intelligible; although an agent might be exercising 
their local autonomy by voluntarily entering into manipulative situations, such an act would directly 
violate their future capacity for autonomous choice, and thus is in tension with their global 
autonomy. Fundamentally, we value autonomy because it enables us to have a holistic control over 
our own lives, rather than because it enables us to perform singular actions. This means that global 
autonomy must take priority over local autonomy. Young’s account thus motivates what I term the 
perfectionist principle - that to be described as globally autonomous, agents must not make choices 
which condemn them to a manipulative situation in the future.  
The perfectionist principle entails that a hard paternalistic intervention with an agent’s locally 
autonomous choice is justified if it protects their global autonomy. For example, Jamie’s desire to 
enter into an autonomy-undermining relationship was authentic, and his decision to do so was 
locally autonomous. But Jamie’s decision enabled a psychological profiling team to manipulate his 
vote. Therefore, Jamie’s decision to trade his privacy for convenience subverted his future capacity 
for autonomy. Since the state is committed to defending, preserving and enhancing autonomy, it 
must intervene with Jamie’s situation, against his will, for his own good.  
6.3. Four conditions for autonomy 
At this stage, it would be advantageous to conduct a brief review of our journey towards an 
externalist-substantivist conception of autonomy. The intuitive account of autonomy struggled to 
determine whether the psychological profiling team had a manipulative or persuasive influence 
upon Amy’s desires, and thereby failed to accurately determine the authenticity and autonomy of 
her voting decision. By employing Christman’s authenticity conditions, we were able to ascertain 
that the profiling team manipulated Amy’s voting decision and thereby violated her autonomy. 
However, due to his exclusive focus on the internal procedure of desire-formation, Christman’s 
account fails deal with cases in which a locally autonomous decision condemns an agent to 
manipulation in the future. 
I propose two modifications to Christman’s internalist-proceduralist account. The first is to observe 
that an agent can be autonomous merely in a local sense, but also in a global sense, and that global 
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autonomy is paramount. The second is to supplement Christman’s internalist conditions with an 
externalist condition; the perfectionist principle introduced in the previous section. Both the 
internalist conditions and the externalist condition are each necessary - but only jointly sufficient - 
for an agent to be deemed fully autonomous.  
So, my alternative account of autonomy states that an agent is merely locally autonomous relative to 
some desire at time t if and only if:  
i) The agent did not resist the development of the desire (prior to t) when attending to this 
process of development, (or would not have resisted that development, had she 
attended to the process). 
ii) The lack of resistance to the development of the desire (prior to t) did not take place (or 
would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. 
iii) The self-reflection involved is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception. 
 
An agent is also globally and thereby fully autonomous relative to the desire if and only if:  
iv) Decisions motivated by the desire do not condemn the agent to a manipulative situation 
in the future. 
 
This account is hierarchical, in that it sees autonomy as being guided by an agent’s higher-order 
attitudes towards their lower-order desires. It is historical, in that it holds the origin of an agent’s 
desires to be crucial for autonomy. It is proceduralist, in that autonomy ascription requires an agent 
to attend (hypothetically, at least) to the process by which their desires are formed. It is internalist - 
in that it holds autonomy to depend upon the psychological state of the agent - but not exclusively 
so. This is because the account is also externalist, as it holds that agents who fail to value their own 
global autonomy are non-autonomous. It is thus strongly substantive, because it makes the content 
of an agent’s desires relevant to autonomy ascription. It is also perfectionist, in that it promotes a 
particular conception of the good. This entails that the account justifies hard paternalism, but only in 
those cases where an agent’s global autonomy is under threat of manipulation. 
Although my account does reject content neutrality, it is compatible with the liberal principle of 
state neutrality, because I assert the primacy of global autonomy over local autonomy. The 
fundamental purpose of the principle of state neutrality is to enable citizens to direct their lives as 
they see fit. Global autonomy is essential to such a project. One’s capacity to pursue one’s own 
conception of the good life depends more on the ability to form long-term life plans, than on the 
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ability to make singular decisions, especially when these decisions lead to autonomy-undermining 
situations. In a sense, the externalist condition does endorse a particular conception of what is 
valuable; namely, global autonomy. However, since the value of global autonomy is supposed to be 
the foundation of all liberal societies, the externalist condition is one that every citizen should be 
able to accept. 
I have argued that this account of autonomy is theoretically plausible. It is also intuitively plausible, 
because it accords with our pre-theoretical intuitions surrounding the concept. It holds that 
autonomy is intrinsically valuable; that autonomous actions involve intentionality, understanding 
and voluntariness; and that most agents, most of the time, are (at least locally) autonomous. 
Furthermore, since my account retains Christman’s conditions for authenticity, it evades the 
problems encountered by the intuitive account. Specifically, it enables us to distinguish between 
persuasive and manipulative influences.  
I have argued that my alternative account of autonomy should be adopted. In the next section, I 
show how this account of autonomy is compatible with the proposed anti-aggregation legislation. 
7. In support of hard privacy paternalism 
In this final section, I offer a defence of the anti-aggregation legislation. First, I reassert why it is 
compatible with a respect for autonomy. Then, I defend it against a more general objection to hard 
paternalism. Finally, I argue that those of both libertarian and liberal persuasion have reasons to 
adopt the legislation. 
Under my externalist-substantivist account of autonomy, the proposed anti-aggregation legislation is 
compatible with a respect for autonomy, even though it constitutes a hard paternalistic intervention. 
For example, if Jamie decides to give away his personal data, this would violate my fourth condition 
for autonomy, because he knowingly condemns himself to future manipulation. Since Jamie meets 
the internal conditions for autonomy, and his desire to waive his privacy is thereby authentic, his 
decision to give away his privacy could be described as locally autonomous. But this decision also 
subverts his global autonomy, because it condemns Jamie to a state of affairs in which he is unable 
to control his own voting decision. Given that we value autonomy because it enables us to have a 
holistic control over our own lives, rather than because it enables us to perform singular actions, 
global autonomy takes precedence over local autonomy. It is justifiable to interfere with an agent’s 
locally autonomous decisions in order to protect their global autonomy. Therefore the anti-
aggregation legislation respects the autonomy of every citizen, even if it sometimes involves hard 
paternalistic intervention. 
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It can be objected, however, that hard paternalism is untenable, because it leads us down a slippery 
slope, upon which more controversial interferences with people’s lives could be defended. Recall the 
objection I raised to Myers’ stringent condition of rationality in section 6.2. The worry was that 
strong conditions for autonomy permit policy makers to justify paternalism in a whole range of cases, 
from gambling to skydiving. Similarly, those who object to hard paternalism worry that, by appealing 
to an agent’s global autonomy, almost any policy could be justified as being ‘for their own good.’ In 
fact, I suggested that China’s one child policy was given such a justification. These concerns reflect 
one of our pre-theoretical intuitions about autonomy; that conditions for autonomy must not be so 
stringent that they exclude everyday cases of self-governance. There must, therefore be a threshold 
of acceptability underneath which paternalistic interferences must not fall. Soft paternalists, such as 
Christman, propose local autonomy as the appropriate threshold: if an action is locally autonomous 
then paternalistic interference is impermissible. Christman’s reasoning seems to be that although 
this threshold might lead to the occasional violation of global autonomy, it is best to err on the side 
of caution, in order to keep the state from interfering with people’s lives in unacceptable ways. 
In response to this objection, it must be pointed out that my version of hard paternalism enacts a 
similar threshold. My threshold, imposed by the fourth condition, is that interference with a locally 
autonomous action is only permissible if the threat of manipulation is present. This rules out 
interference with many locally autonomous actions; those which do threaten an agent’s global 
autonomy, but do not involve manipulation. My threshold thereby keeps us away from the slippery 
slope upon which many unacceptable paternalistic laws can be justified. For example, since the 
locally autonomous decision to gamble or to skydive does not condemn one to future manipulation, 
hard paternalism is impermissible in these cases. But the locally autonomous decision to give away 
one’s personal data does condemn agents to future manipulation, via psychological profiling. 
Therefore, hard paternalism is permissible in these cases. 
If one finds this defence of hard paternalism unconvincing, however, this does not entail that the 
anti-aggregation legislation is unjustifiable. In fact, the legislation can even be justified to 
“libertarians”, who are surely the most ardent anti-paternalists imaginable. Since libertarians believe 
in extremely minimal principles of justice, any legislation that they would approve has a good chance 
of being approved by others. The basic foundation of libertarian thought is John Stuart Mill’s harm 
principle (Hamowy, 2008, p.xxi). In opposition to paternalism, Mill (2003, p.68) argued that  "the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others." In other words, intervention with an agent’s action is 
only permitted if that action will harm other agents. Therefore, according to libertarians, even the 
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soft variety of paternalism is unwarranted, because paternalistic interference, by definition, 
functions to protect individuals from harming themselves. With regards to both Amy and Jamie then, 
the libertarian would argue that, since their actions violate only their own global autonomy, and 
nobody else’s, intervention is unjustified. 
In response, an alternative justification for the anti-aggregation legislation can be provided, which 
shows how Amy and Jamie’s decisions about their own privacy cause harm to others. Firstly, it is 
clear that, if we allow powerful agents to manipulate the results of elections, this has the potential 
to harm everyone. A politician elected by such means would be unlikely to find it immoral to violate 
the privacy and autonomy of his citizens in other ways. One major worry in such a scenario would be 
that the surveillance powers of the state could be employed in order to repress his opponents. 
Cumulative individual decisions to trade privacy for convenience are leading us towards a society in 
which everyone’s privacy, and thereby their autonomy, are drastically reduced. 
So, when people like Jamie exhibit indifference to their own informational privacy, the libertarian 
might presume that the only person Jamie is harming is himself. But Jamie’s decision to give up his 
privacy does not just have consequences for him; it also makes other people, who do care about 
privacy, less able to defend it. As Roessler (2013, p.18) points out, “some people’s indifference to 
their privacy makes it harder for others who care about their privacy to convince firms and officials 
to institute data protection measures.” A case in point is the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act 2016, 
which has been described as “one of the most extreme surveillance laws ever passed in a democracy” 
(Travis, 2016). The act was passed in an environment of public indifference and “devastatingly poor 
political opposition” (Carlo, 2016). Criticisms of the act were not publicised because, according to 
MP David Davis, “the public doesn’t care enough about encroachments on their freedom” (Moss, 
2015). This example shows that when individuals adopt attitudes of indifference towards their 
informational privacy, they limit the capacity of others to protect and enjoy their own privacy. And, 
as we have seen, if an agent lacks informational privacy, their global autonomy is threatened by 
psychological profiling. Since Jamie’s decision can be said to harm others in this way, even the 
libertarian, who rejects all paternalistic intervention, is forced to accept the legitimacy of the anti-
aggregation legislation. 
Liberals, as well as libertarians, should accept the anti-aggregation legislation, because it is 
compatible with the liberal principle of state neutrality. Although we want the government to be 
neutral with regards to competing conceptions of the good, there are certain fundamental values 
that the liberal state can defend without hypocrisy. Since the state is committed to defending global 
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autonomy, and informational privacy protects global autonomy, the state must enact privacy 
paternalism. As Allen (1999, p.752) puts it: 
“A conception of the good that permits privacy to be waived…is like a vision of the good that 
permits freedom to be waived. As liberals, we should not want people to sell all their 
freedom, and, as liberals, we should not want people to sell all their privacy and capacities 
for private choices.”  
Conclusion 
I have argued that the use by political electoral campaigns of psychological profiling in order to 
influence voting decisions threatens the autonomy of voters, and should therefore be outlawed. To 
support my claim, I have developed a unique theoretical account of autonomy. As Calabrese (in an 
interview with Beckett, 2012) warns, if informational privacy is not defended, then “any voter is 
open to manipulation.” And since the manipulation of one’s voting decision constitutes a severe 
violation of one’s autonomy, a hard version of privacy paternalism is justified. Although privacy 
paternalism might limit options in the short term, it protects global autonomy in the long term. 
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